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Abstract—All Cloud computing standards are dependent upon
checklist methodology to implement and then audit the alignment
of a company or an operation with the standards that have been
set. An investigation of the use of checklists in other academic
areas has shown there to be significant weaknesses in the checklist
solution to both implementation and audit; these weaknesses will
only be exacerbated by the fast-changing and developing nature
of clouds. We examine the problems that are inherent with using
checklists and seek to identify some mitigating strategies that
might be adopted to improve their efficacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Standards have the checklist as an implementation and
audit feature embedded in their very essence. Checklists are
a relatively simple subset of the broader category of “deci-
sion aids”. Decision aids can also include various modelling
techniques and expert systems. Other academic disciplines
ranging from accountancy to medicine have critically assessed
the value and problems associated with decision aids (see
Beck, 2014 [1] for a recent example), whereas the computer
science literature has little critical appraisal of the efficacy
of the implicit checklists embedded in the security standards.
Acceptance of an emphasis on compliance with standards
being the aim rather than discovery (or non-discovery) of an
actual security issue is a further problem exacerbated by the
security environment changing faster than any agreed standard
and consequent checklist can keep up with. This paper seeks
to question checklist efficacy and, by seeking questions and
mitigating practices from other disciplines, to inform a more
developed and less naı¨ve discussion of such decision aids
within cloud computer security protocols and audits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section II we discuss the issues of cloud audit and account-
ability, and; in Section III the use of checklists in cloud audit;
in Section IV we look at checklist use in wider society; in
Section V we consider whether they work, and ask how they
might be made better; and in Section VI our conclusions.
II. AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CLOUD
Auditing in the accountancy world has enjoyed the benefit
of over a century of practice and experience, yet there remain
differences of opinion and a number of problems are yet
to be resolved. Duncan and Whittington [2] provide some
useful background on this issue. Cloud computing audit, by
comparison, can not be considered a mature field, and there
will clearly be some way to go before it will be able to catch
up with work done in the accounting profession. An obvious
area of weakness arises when taking audit professionals from
the accounting world out from their comfort zone, and placing
them in a more technical field. Equally, the use of people with
a computing background can help some of these issues, but in
turn, their lack of audit background presents another weakness.
Some research into cloud audit has been undertaken, but
has been limited due to a combination of the lack of maturity in
this field and the greater technical complexities posed by cloud
computing. A number of potential issues [3] arise with the
adoption of cloud computing, including security, privacy and
audit. Foster et al [4] compare and contrast cloud computing
with grid computing and comment on how the important issues
have changed. A proposed framework for promoting trust in
the use of cloud systems [5] identified the need to ensure a
proper audit trail is maintained. Companies will be unable
to pass audit by their customers [6] if they are unable to
demonstrate an adequate level of control over cloud data.
Wang et al [7] propose a mechanism to allow a third party
auditor to conduct a cloud audit on behalf of a customer who
may not have the skills to carry it out themselves. Chow et
al [8] consider some implications of the difficulties of cloud
audit and Armbrust et al [9] note that lack of auditability
of cloud presents the no. 3 barrier to cloud take-up. Pearson
and Charlesworth [10] consider the development of procedural
and technical solutions to address jurisdictional privacy and
security risks within the cloud, proposing that procedural and
technical solutions are co-designed to demonstrate account-
ability as a path forward to resolving jurisdictional privacy
and security risks within the cloud.
While many of the issues surrounding cloud computing are
very similar to previous issues [11], two facets are to some
degree new and fundamental to cloud computing: the com-
plexities of multi-party trust considerations; and the ensuing
need for mutual auditability. The lack of auditability[12], par-
ticularly in light of the stringent requirements of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act, is the no. 3 barrier to cloud adoption. Pearson and
Benameur [13] consider the use of tracing audit authorities
to enhance privacy, security and trust. Ramgovind et al [14]
provide an overall security perspective of Cloud computing and
aim to highlight the security concerns that should be properly
addressed and managed to realize its full potential. Zhou et al
[15] propose an additional audit layer to be run on the cloud
system to “watch over” what goes on in the cloud. Wang et al
[16] propose a scheme to support scalable and efficient public
auditing in cloud computing, noting the challenge in trying to
provide adequate public audit, while preserving privacy.
A proposed Accountability as a Service approach [17]
using continuous cloud monitoring and audit to ensure better
quality of service, uses a novel design to achieve Trustworthy
Service Oriented Architecture (TSOA) in the Cloud through
enforcing strong accountability. Cloud services should be mu-
tually accountable to both cloud service provider and customer
[18], to ensure proper service levels can be achieved, but some
challenges remain to be overcome. Despite auditability being
one of the key components of trust [19], most of the prominent
cloud service providers are failing to address this. They suggest
that users can at best monitor the virtual hardware performance
metrics and the system event logs of the services they engage
and that service providers could increase accountability and
auditability by using mechanisms such as tracking of file
access histories, which will empower service providers and
users to reduce many of the key threats.
Proper metrics are not yet adapted to cloud infrastructures
[20] and there are no standardized cloud-specific security
metrics that customers can use to monitor the security status of
their cloud resources. Until such standard security metrics are
developed and implemented, controls for security assessment,
audit, and accountability will be more difficult and costly
and might even be impossible to employ. A novel highly
decentralized information accountability framework [21] to
keep track of the actual usage of the users’ data in the cloud
is mooted. Pearson et al [22] propose a data management
solution to provide accountability within the cloud as well as
addressing privacy issues, using trust authorities. Cloud and IT
service providers should act as responsible stewards [23] for
the data of their customers and users, but note the absence of
accountability frameworks for distributed IT services makes
it difficult for users to understand, influence and determine
how their service providers honour their obligations. The
threat posed by the lack of proper auditability in the cloud
is recognised [24], particularly where multiple cloud service
providers are involved in a single provision to a customer.
Ruebsamen and Reich [25] consider the use of audit agents in
the cloud to try to address this issue. Doelitzscher et al [26]
begin experimenting with the use of neural networks in cloud
systems to detect anomalies, specifically in IaaS clouds. While
this has proved successful utilising historic data, it is not yet
sufficiently developed to run in a real time environment, but
offers some promise. We can see that concerns are being ex-
pressed in cloud audit and accountability research. Meanwhile,
audit, accountability and compliance with standards continue
to be practised utilising more basic techniques as we will see
in the next section.
III. CHECKLISTS IN THE CLOUD
Cloud security is often approached through standards com-
pliance, with a number of security standards already evolved
over recent years, but the very number presents a weakness,
namely which one to comply with. Should it be ARTS, CSA,
CSCC, DMTF, ENISA, ETSI, FedRamp, GAPP, GICTF, ISO,
ITU, NIST, OASIS, OCC, OGF, OMG, PCI or SNIA ([27]–
[31]), to name but a few? None of these standards provides
complete security — there is no “one size covers all” —
another weakness. Even compliance with all standards will
not guarantee complete security, yet another weakness.
Many standards were developed before cloud computing
evolved. The pace of evolution of new technology far outstrips
the capability of standards organizations to keep up with the
changes [32], leading to further weakness — the lack of
currency. There is a commendable move between standards
organizations to chart common ground between their respective
standards, but there is a long way to go. The standards tend
to be described in a hierarchical fashion, resulting in what
is essentially a structured list of areas to be addressed. The
implementation process involves audit by an external body,
accredited by the standards organization, who must demon-
strate a high level of expertise in carrying out audit work,
have a sufficient level of experience and a good understanding
of the requirements of the standard. Usually many of these
audit firms come from the accounting profession, but this is
not always the case. One factor common to all is that due to
economic considerations, the full audit is unlikely to be carried
out by the designated audit professional. Work is delegated to
junior, less experienced, staff and is frequently implemented
by the use of checklists. The list of areas of the standard to
be addressed lends itself to the use of checklists, and many
standards organizations encourage this approach. However, the
checklist will only ever be as good as the expert who devises
the questions to be asked within the checklist.
This obsession with the checklist approach spawns further
weaknesses. The company implementing the standard is seek-
ing to be compliant, thus will gear their systems to meet the
requirements of the standard, but as a result may take their
eye off the ball regarding more basic monitoring controls,
presenting a weakness. The auditors seek to ensure the areas
to be addressed in the standard are addressed by the company,
and will do likewise, with the focus on completing the checklist
leading to acquiring a sufficient number of checks in the “Yes”
boxes. There is another weakness to be considered — the fact
that compliance, once obtained, is not necessarily repeated
with any degree of regularity. There is only a requirement to
seek re-certification following major system change, or a few
years down the line. A further weakness concerns the nature
of the questions which are actually asked. Here are a couple of
examples which clearly demonstrate whether the right question
is being asked, but without sufficient depth to be able to gauge
the degree of success of the outcome:
Q Are suitable controls applied when personnel use your
equipment to work at home? Yes No N/A
A A Yes answer is not enough. There is a need to
understand how effective the controls are in operation. If the
company applies suitable controls, they get compliance, but if
the controls don’t work, they don’t get security!
Q Are your information classification guidelines consistent
with your access control policy? Yes No N/A
A Again, a Yes answer is not enough. There is a need to
understand how well the underlying dependency on the access
control policy will work in practice. If company guidelines
are consistent, but underlying controls are flawed, there is
compliance, but if the controls don’t work, there is no secu-
rity! Similarly, if the information classification guidelines are
consistent with the underlying access control policy, but the
guidelines are ignored, there is compliance, but no security.
While this results in compliance, where is the value in
compliance with a standard which does not cover everything,
is not current, and not necessarily asking the right kind of
questions, let alone often enough? So, are checklists all bad
news? Not necessarily. There are a number of advantages.
Providing they have been properly devised by a suitable expert,
their use can be substantially delegated to less skilled, i.e.
cheaper staff. They can be completed relatively quickly and are
particularly well suited to repetitive tasks. Providing sufficient
supporting evidence is collected to substantiate the answers
given, this can provide the basis for an excellent working paper
for both internal and external audit review purposes.
This has to be considered in the light of changes in
the threat environment. Latest estimates [33] are that over
200,000 new pieces of malware are released globally every day,
which represents over 73 million new annual global threats
potentially deployable against every computer connected to
the internet. How can standards compliance be reconciled with
this rapidly evolving threat environment, which is evolving far
faster than the standards can keep up? This disparity between
what protection companies believe they have and the real world
presents a clear and present danger. Research into this area
within cloud computing is somewhat sparse. Chen and Yoon
[11] and Bhandari and Mishra [34] use checklists at a high
level of abstraction in considering cloud audit, but neither
attempt to consider the implications of their use at a detailed
technical level. Perhaps we may gain some insight by looking
at how checklists are used in other areas of society. Their use in
areas such as audit, medicine, aviation, education and a variety
of other areas present a reasonably mature field of research to
review.
IV. CHECKLISTS IN WIDER SOCIETY
Many academic disciplines consider the use of checklists
within their own area and do so critically, highlighting likely
areas of weakness. Before examining two specific disciplines
in more detail, we endeavour to give an impression of the
broad spread of interest and concern across academia. Colmar
[35] considered the limitations of checklists in assessing child
behaviour and academic achievement, concluding that they
have “real limitations”, and Hosie [36] notes that checklists
need to be tailored to the type of course (online in this
case) being evaluated. Palmer [37] looks specifically at well
known aviation flight checklists and considers the impact of
the automation of checklists and how that lead to reduced
awareness of the situation and of the system itself. Indeed,
in their field study, Degani and Wiener [38] report the lack
of attention to human factors and improper use can impact
adversely on safety. Cooperative evaluation [39] is most useful
for early feedback about re-design in a rapid iterative cycle in
the context of software development. This can be used with:
• an existing product that is to be improved or extended;
• with an early partial prototype or simulation;
• with a full working prototype.
In a survey of 117 checklists from 24 sources [40], different
categories of checklist items are discussed and examples are
provided of good items as well as those that should be
avoided, which highlights the need for feedback on checklist
effectiveness. There are some very interesting observations
on the logic behind [41], and the various methodologies
employed in, differing types of evaluation checklist providing
some ideas for good design. In trying to improve project
estimation [42] found that checklists could improve estimation
accuracy, reducing over-runs. Poor or even deceitful use of
checklists in the food chain [43] has clear and obvious warning
bells for cloud security with its multiple players, complex
structures and potentially differing priorities of each of the
participant individuals or companies, and emphasises the need
for checklist governance. We now move on to consider the two
specific disciplines in more detail, starting with medicine.
A. Checklists in Medicine
The use of decision aids and checklists is an important
topic as they appear to offer better healthcare, being available
more widely and potentially at lower cost, yet recognising that
if they do not work, medical outcomes could be catastrophic.
Medical studies are also aware of broader societal use of
checklists [44], and see that concerns over stress and tiredness
when using checklists in a medical situation would be mirrored
in other settings. Most studies are positive about checklist
use but stipulate some limiting factors or additional elements
that would facilitate their usefulness. Testing, careful design
and training for users, are accepted as useful [45], offering
“reliable repeatable outcomes.”There is a need for a qualitative
judgement on the outcome of a checklist[46] by a “carefully
composed multi-disciplinary group”(p336). Some more recent
studies — Bosk et al [47], Winters et al [48], Davidoff [49]
and Nanji and Cooper [50] — are also positive in principle
about the use of checklists whilst stating some additional
requirements for a successful checklist. Bosk [47] tries to
reduce the excitement of seeing checklists as a universal
panacea, stating the need for assessing outcomes and for them
to be used in an appropriate performance culture. Winters et
al [48] put forward arguments for broader use of checklists to
spread knowledge more widely.
Checklists can be game-changing [49], yet, their use “as
quick and simple tools aimed to buttress the memory and skills
of expert professionals”(p207), seemingly does not see them as
spreading an expert’s knowledge to become more widely ap-
plied by those with lesser knowledge or professional training.
There is a need for careful design and training [50] whilst also
being positive about the value of checklists. Some concerning
negative results also exist. Regehr et al[51], find that a global
ranking scale, allowing for an expert to use their broader
expertise, significantly outscored checklists. In a similar vein,
Hodges et al [52], found that clerks outscored consultants with
a checklist, but the consultants were the best performers when
allowed a broader ranking approach. With this ongoing level
of interest, a survey of checklist medical research literature
found [53] that “a highly effective, standardized methodology
for the development and design of medical-specific checklists
has not previously been developed and validated, which has
likely contributed to their inconsistent use in several key fields
of medicine, despite evidence of their fundamental role in
error management”(p22). Hence one might conclude that the
medical literature sees checklists as helpful with caveats and
limitations, though has yet to find a bullet-proof approach
for their development, design or, implementation. The second
example discipline, which perhaps has a more relevant bearing
on cloud computing, is audit.
B. Checklists in Audit
The auditing of financial statements is a further area where
there has been an increasing reliance on checklists and other
decision aids. A particular focus has been on the assessing of
fraud risk, which would have some similarities to detecting
security breaches in the cloud. The following paragraphs give
a flavour of the research. Comparing the outcomes of unaided
decisions [54] when checklists, logit models or expert systems
are used, the expert system outperformed, with logit model also
out-performing checklists. Dowling [55] concluded that the
appropriate use of a checklist depended on corporate pressures,
auditor attitude and the auditor’s position in the firm hierarchy.
In fraud detection [56] noted the poor uptake of approaches
that had a good pedigree of problem finding — including
discovery sampling, data mining, forensic accounting and
digital analysis software. They question the quality of the cost-
benefit trade-off decisions that were being made especially by
small firms who might see the additional cost as prohibitive,
but don’t fully assess the potential costs of undiscovered fraud.
Boritz and Timoshenko [57], which we will return to later, try
and map out the issues that need to be addressed in making the
use of a checklist more robust in delivering broad objectives
(as opposed to answering a myriad of subsidiary questions).
They present their concerns in a diagram that we generalize
and adapt below. Auditors who used a standard risk checklist
[58], structured by SAS 82 (an AICPA audit standard) risk
categories, made lower risk assessments than those without
a checklist, which suggests that the use of the checklist was
associated with a less effective diagnosis of the fraud and found
that poorly designed checklists had the potential of stopping
an auditor from forming a good overall picture of the fraud
situation. Mock and Turner [59], using a sample of 202 audit
clients obtained from three large audit firms, found evidence
that following the issuance of SAS No. 82, audits became less
reliant on the outcomes of checklists.
One common checklist in the audit of financial statements
is a check that all disclosures required by current accounting
standards have been included in the report to be published
to shareholders. Rinsum [60] discusses the problem that this
technical achievement (i.e. conformity) to the standards does
not necessarily lead to the broader (and in theory more impor-
tant) achievement of delivering a meaningful and reasonable
view and understanding of the company’s financial position.
Checklists, it seems might be useful for assessing minute item-
by-item compliance, but risk undermining the development of
the bigger picture. This might also be seen as a good example
of a checklist making life easier for the auditing company
whilst potentially short changing the ultimate client — the
shareholder. Both of these points can be seen to have direct
relevance to a cloud security checklist.
V. DO CHECKLISTS WORK?
This leads us to the obvious question, do checklists work?
On the evidence of our discussion, there is clearly no definitive
answer to that question. Sometimes they do, sometimes they
don’t and sometimes they might if a few changes were to be
made. Let us examine why this might be.
On the plus side:
• we have the possibility of using less senior staff;
• we have the possibility of saving time, and money;
• checklists are ideally suited to repetitive tasks;
• providing sufficient supporting evidence is collected, the
checklist approach can work well.
On the minus side:
• multiplicity, lack of coherence, lack of completeness,
currency of current standards and lack of frequency of
the audit are issues;
• slavish following of checklist questions to detailed struc-
ture of standards;
• can lead to company taking eye off the ball, missing the
basics;
• can lead auditors to focus on the standards checklist rather
than on the underlying issues;
• the type of questions asked are often not searching
enough.
Having recognised the inherent failings of the checklist,
we need to consider how we might go about improving this
situation. We return to Boritz and Timoshenko [61], who
produced an interesting diagram to characterise factors which
might be incorporated to improve the effectiveness of the
checklist.
Fig. 1. Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of a Checklist
Flowchart Adapted from Boritz and Timoshenko [61]
We have adapted this diagram to suit the particular needs
of cloud computing. For each question included in a checklist,
we must consider the context in which it will apply, taking into
account any appropriate environmental factors. There will need
to be at the start point, a firm idea of the nature of the task, and
at the end point, an expectation of what the desired outcome
should be. We look at each of the stages in turn. Starting with
the nature of the task, we can categorise that into either a
compliance-based task, or a diagnostic-based task. Depending
on which category is appropriate, the type of question needed
will vary, e.g. we may have a compliance requirement which
we are hoping to demonstrate compliance with, but before we
can demonstrate compliance, we may have to undertake some
diagnostic work to provide the necessary assurance that the
requisite level of compliance has been achieved.
This takes us to the next stage, the checklist design.
This will be heavily influenced by the checklist designer
characteristics. The degree to which a successful design is
achieved by an auditor who is to design the checklist will
very much depend on their experience, expertise and whether
they are prone to overconfidence. The checklist design will
comprise three categories: custom; diagnostic and structural.
In the custom section, the degree to which a generic approach,
or a customized approach is required will influence the design.
In the diagnostic section, will the approach need to broad, or
a narrow array of items only and will predictive strength of
items need to be considered? In the Structure section, will the
checklist have a hierarchical organization? Will there need to
be decomposition into categories and sub-categories?
This, leads to the next stage, the checklist application. This
will be heavily influenced by the checklist operator. As with
the checklist designer, their background experience, expertise
and the degree of overconfidence they might exhibit will all
have an impact on the successful outcome of the exercise.
The checklist application stage will be broken down into
method, and single/group sections. The method of combining
cues will need to consider whether the approach should be
subjective/intuitive, or deliberative, or model based (regression,
expert system, etc). The single/group section will need to
consider whether the audit is being conducted by an interactive
audit team, or by a non-interactive audit team, or by an
individual auditor.
There will be other factors influencing the checklist ap-
plication. Performance issues such as financial incentives,
justification, outcome feedback, and so on may have to be
taken into account. On the legal front, there are legal liability
considerations, such as will the result be defend-able in court?
This should allow reaching the conclusion/judgement stage. By
properly taking all the previous influences into account, it will
be possible to reach a satisfactory conclusion, or judgement, or
some other result, that will more accurately reflect the realities
of the situation under review. It is important that practitioners
do not lose sight of the overview when using checklists and
they must be fully aware of the shortcomings outlined earlier,
and take them fully into account when carrying out their work.
They should not be blinded by the use of checklists to the point
where the checklist becomes the focus of the audit. Rather, the
checklist should always be viewed as a very useful tool in the
auditor’s armoury.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this short paper, we have attempted to present some of
the complexities and issues around the use of decision aids and
checklists in particular. Other areas of academic study have a
more developed critique of checklists than computer science
and cloud security in particular, although it is clear that lessons
from these areas are of relevance to the cloud. It would seem
that there is no one approach or system that can confidently be
applied to checklist design, implementation and interpretation
to guarantee meaningful, robust and trustworthy results. We
have shown some pointers to improving current practice and
to the likelihood that checklists and their use will always be
flawed, but always tempting due to the potential for low cost
mass implementation. A checklist may only be able to check
for conformity to a standard (in cloud, an inevitably out of
date standard) rather than guarantee the absence of (or finding
of) underlying problems.
The checklist straight jacket may also deny an experienced
practitioner the opportunity to develop a rounded understand-
ing of the situation by being forced to focus on the individual
trees rather than the wood as a whole. Other approaches to
addressing conformity and audit from other disciplines could
be usefully considered in a cloud setting. These alternatives
to checklists would be likely to have the downside of greater
cost, but the potential upside of greater benefit.
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